TLDR
Adversaries establish multiple persistence mechanisms, move laterally, and exploit blind spots within the first 48 hours of compromise. Most incident response plans focus on containing initial access before understanding the full scope.
Three critical gaps emerge: IR teams treat initial compromise as the complete incident while attackers have already established redundant access; lateral movement happens faster than IR teams mobilize; and attackers specifically target systems with logging gaps that IR procedures overlook. Closing these gaps requires assuming the worst during early-stage response rather than following standard containment playbooks.
Introduction
After gaining initial access to a network, a skilled operator spends the first 12 to 48 hours moving laterally, establishing redundant access points, and positioning for primary objectives. Defenders, during this same window, typically mobilize their incident response team, scope the initial compromise, and plan containment around the entry point they discovered.
By the time the IR team executes their containment strategy, the attacker is already three steps ahead.
This mismatch between how incident response teams operate in the first 48 hours and how attackers actually behave during that same window creates a predictable gap. Offensive security experience provides a different lens on early-stage incident response priorities. We see where standard IR playbooks align with attacker behavior and where they diverge completely.
This isn’t about advocating for a complete overhaul of incident response procedures. Most IR frameworks handle forensics, communication, and recovery effectively. The problem lies in specific blind spots during the initial phase, blind spots that attackers exploit systematically because they understand how IR teams respond.
Three patterns emerge repeatedly from offensive engagements that reveal fundamental gaps in how organizations approach the first 48 hours of an incident.
Problem 1: The Persistence Problem Most IR Plans Ignore
Incident response teams typically treat the initial compromise as the incident itself. Offensive operators know it’s just the beginning.
During red team engagements, we establish three to five different persistence mechanisms within the first 24 hours of gaining access. This isn’t paranoia or over-engineering. It’s standard operating procedure based on a simple assumption: initial access will be discovered. Skilled attackers plan for it.
Here’s how this plays out. A red team gains initial access through a compromised webshell on a public-facing application. Within six hours, we’ve harvested credentials, created a scheduled task on an internal system, established WMI event subscriptions for backup access, and compromised a service account with network access. The webshell itself becomes disposable.
Two days later, the security team detects the webshell. They isolate the compromised server, remove the malicious files, patch the vulnerability, and declare the incident contained. The IR report shows rapid detection and effective response.
Meanwhile, the red team still has full access through four other mechanisms. We’ve already moved laterally, accessed sensitive systems, and positioned ourselves for data exfiltration. The “contained” incident was just the front door we expected to lose.
This pattern repeats across nearly every engagement. IR teams focus on eliminating the known compromise while attackers have already established redundant access points. The first 48 hours should prioritize mapping the full scope of compromise before declaring containment. Assume multiple persistence mechanisms exist. Hunt for credential access, lateral movement indicators, and secondary footholds before celebrating quick wins.
Removing initial access without understanding the full scope isn’t containment. It’s giving attackers permission to work undisturbed.
Even when IR teams recognize the persistence problem, they face a second challenge: speed.
Problem 2: Lateral Movement Happens Faster Than IR Mobilizes
By the time an incident response team is fully assembled and executing their containment strategy, skilled attackers have already moved laterally across the environment.
Initial access to domain administrator privileges takes under four hours in typical enterprise environments. This isn’t theoretical. Red team engagements test this timeline repeatedly across different organizations, different security postures, and different detection capabilities. The pattern holds.
Within the first 24 hours, we typically access domain controllers, backup systems, and cloud administration accounts. These aren’t stretch goals or best-case scenarios. They’re standard progression for any competent operator who understands Windows environments and basic lateral movement techniques.
Compare this to typical incident response mobilization. A phishing email gets clicked at 9am Monday. The compromise is detected and reported by 2pm. The IR team mobilizes by 6pm. Scoping and containment planning happens Monday evening and Tuesday morning. First containment actions execute Tuesday afternoon.
During that same timeline from the offensive perspective:
- Domain admin access by noon Monday
- Critical data identified and accessed by 9pm Monday
- Backup systems compromised Tuesday morning
Data staged for exfiltration by the time IR executes their first containment action.
The gap isn’t caused by slow IR teams. Standard incident response procedures require triage, analysis, and careful planning. The problem is that attackers don’t wait for defenders to complete these steps.
This means IR plans need to assume lateral movement has already occurred by the time initial detection happens. First actions should focus on high-value targets like domain controllers, privileged accounts, and backup infrastructure rather than just the initial compromise point. Hunt for lateral movement indicators in the first hours. Don’t wait for forensic confirmation to investigate whether attackers reached critical systems.
Speed alone doesn’t explain the full advantage attackers have. They also know exactly where not to look.
Problem 3: Attackers Know Your Blind Spots Better Than Your IR Team Does
Offensive operators specifically test incident response capabilities during engagements. We learn which actions trigger alerts and which go completely unnoticed. We measure time between detection and response. We identify systems with logging gaps. We map where IR teams look first and where they never look at all.
This intelligence becomes part of the operational plan. During the first 48 hours, we prioritize activities in the blind spots.
Real patterns emerge across red team engagements. Cloud environments show consistent gaps in lateral movement detection. Organizations assume their monitoring covers Azure or AWS when it actually only catches a fraction of administrative actions. Lateral movement through cloud identities and service principals often goes undetected for days.
OT and ICS networks present another predictable gap. Organizations treat these systems as air-gapped, but multiple connection points exist for remote access, vendor support, and data integration. IR teams rarely include these networks in initial incident scoping because they assume isolation that doesn’t actually exist.
SaaS applications and third-party integrations consistently fall outside incident response scope. An attacker compromising Okta, accessing SharePoint through a compromised service account, or moving laterally through a third-party integration rarely triggers the same IR mobilization as a traditional network compromise.
Professional threat actors conduct similar reconnaissance. They map IR capabilities before executing their primary objectives. They understand typical response timelines and plan accordingly. They specifically target systems with weak logging or detection gaps.
IR teams should adopt the same methodology for their own capabilities. Test response plans against actual attacker techniques, not compliance scenarios. Identify blind spots before real attackers exploit them. The organizations with the strongest incident response capabilities combine defensive procedures with offensive thinking.
These three gaps create a window where attackers operate freely while IR teams follow standard playbooks. Closing them requires thinking like an attacker during the first 48 hours.
Conclusion
Effective incident response in the first 48 hours requires understanding attacker behavior, not just following IR runbooks. Standard procedures handle many aspects of incident management well, but they consistently miss specific patterns that offensive operators exploit systematically.
Three shifts close these gaps. First, assume multiple persistence mechanisms exist rather than treating initial access as the complete compromise. Second, assume lateral movement has already occurred by the time detection happens. Third, hunt in the blind spots first rather than starting with systems that have the best logging and visibility.
Small changes make these shifts practical. Run tabletop exercises that start with the assumption that attackers already have domain admin access. Map your actual logging coverage against critical systems rather than assuming comprehensive visibility. Test detection capabilities in cloud environments and SaaS applications the same way you test on-premises systems. Build relationships between your IR team and anyone with offensive security experience, whether internal red team members or external partners who can provide that perspective.
Organizations with strong incident response capabilities combine defensive procedures with offensive perspectives. The first 48 hours determine whether an incident remains a contained security event or escalates into a major breach. The difference often comes down to whether IR teams understand how attackers actually operate during that critical window, or whether they’re following playbooks designed for a different threat model.